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ECHOES OF A DYING STATE: PERESTROIKA PROPAGANDA IN 
THE SOVIET FOREIGN PRESS
By Matthew Brown
“Perestroika means mass initiative.  It is the comprehensive devel-
opment of democracy, socialist self-government, encouragement 
of initiative and creative endeavor, improved order and discipline, 
more glasnost, criticism and self-criticism in all spheres of our 
society.  It is utmost respect for the individual and consideration 
for personal dignity.”230
The collapse of the Soviet Union marked the end of one of the most tumultuous 
and volatile periods in modern history.  The Soviet Union was not destroyed by 
a foreign military invasion, nor was it torn apart by civil war.  The events that 
resulted in one of the most powerful countries the world has ever seen literally 
signing itself out of existence were official government policy, heavily promoted 
by the Communist Party as the pinnacle of Soviet ideology, and praised by the 
Soviet intelligentsia as a clear path to a prosperous society.  The perestroika 
and glasnost reforms, instituted under Mikhail Gorbachev, represent the final 
230  Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1987), 34. 
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chapter of the Soviet Union’s history before its collapse in 1991 and the split-
ting of the Union into 15 post-Soviet republics. How did such promising and 
widely acclaimed plans destroy the very society on which they were built?  The 
answer to this question lies in how the Soviet Union mobilized its citizens to 
action; in propaganda.
 The reforms began with Gorbachev’s assumption to the position of the 
General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in March of 
1985.  Gorbachev’s vision for the future of the Soviet Union involved a pub-
lic examination of the social, economic, and political issues that plagued the 
country at the time, while simultaneously developing programs to prepare the 
Soviet Union for future development in all spheres of life.231  The term per-
estroika was adopted to define the task at hand.  Perestroika translates to English 
as “restructuring”, underlining that a massive change was needed within the 
Communist Party and the Soviet Union, and not simply a handful of minor 
adjustments.  This proposed restructuring of the entire Soviet system and so-
ciety was to be driven by two concepts: glasnost (openness) and demokratizatsia 
(democratization), ultimately resulting in the revitalization of the communist 
party and the Soviet Union.232  The “openness” of glasnost meant that issues 
such as the shortcomings of the Soviet planned economy,  corruption within 
the Communist Party and state bureaucracies, ideological disputes, and foreign 
policy would no longer be covered up, but openly discussed and solutions 
sought.  Moving hand-in-hand with the dialogue and self-criticism inspired 
by glasnost, democratization worked to alleviate totalitarian elements in Soviet 
society and politics by replacing the appointment system with elections for state 
leadership positions and factory management.
 Scholarly writing about the 1980s reforms in the Soviet Union tends to 
fall into two distinct camps.  The type of writing that emerged first is largely 
focused on the role of Mikhail Gorbachev as the chief orchestrator of reform. 
Titles including The Gorbachev Phenomenon, Can Gorbachev Change the Soviet 
Union?, and Gorbachev’s Revolution illustrate the academic fascination with the 
man, and hold him as a figure to guide their discourse and analysis of perestroika 
231  Moshe Lewin, The Gorbachev Phenomenon: A Historical Interpretation (Berkley: University 
of California Press, 1988), ix.
232  John F.N. Bradley, Soviet Perestroika, 1985-1993: Russia’s Road to Democracy (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1995), 15.
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and glasnost.233  They view Gorbachev’s efforts as in earnest, though perhaps 
too ambitious or with little chance of success.234  Though this style persisted 
beyond the collapse of the Soviet Union, it first emerged out of a necessity 
to discuss the reforms, despite the absence of quantifiable results while the 
reforms were underway.  Following the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, more 
complex arguments emerged.  With knowledge of how Gorbachev’s programs 
played out, it became possible to widen one’s perspective on the reforms with 
information about how different factions of the Soviet government and public 
responded to the changes and how these reactions ultimately led to the end 
of the Soviet state.  These pieces take the internal politics of the Soviet Union 
into account, along with public opinion and international relations.  While 
presenting the multifaceted nature of perestroika and glasnost and the wide 
effect of the reforms, these later works hold a general consensus that the rise of 
nationalism in the Soviet Republics (in the wake of perestroika’s restructuring 
initiatives) is the major reason for collapse.235  
 A theme that features heavily within both major types of literature is the 
legacy of Joseph Stalin.  Be it a focus on Gorbachev’s final undoing of Stalin, 
or the role that Stalinism played in holding the Soviet Union together, the 
argument remains the same: the perestroika reforms represented a move away 
from Stalin’s authoritarian command structure that persisted since his death 
in 1953, and thus, shook Soviet society to its very core.  Susanne Sternthal, in 
her book Gorbachev’s Reforms: De-Stalinization through Demilitarization, argues 
that Josef Stalin is responsible for the various problems that Mikhail Gorbachev 
233  Lewin, The Gorbachev Phenomenon; Zdenek Mlynar, Can Gorbachev Change the Soviet 
Union? (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990); Susanne Sternthal, Gorbachev’s Reforms, De-Stalinization 
through Demilitarization (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1997); Anthony D’Agostino, Gorbachev’s 
Revolution (New York: New York University Press, 1998).
234  Marc Zlotnik, “Rethinking Soviet Socialism: The Politics of Ideological Change,” in 
Restructuring Soviet Ideology: Gorbachev’s New Thinking, ed. Sylvia Woodby and Alfred B. Evans, 
Jr. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), 13-37.
235  George J. Neimanis, The Collapse of the Soviet Empire: A View from Riga (Westport: Prager 
Publishers, 1997); Elie Kedourie, “Nationalism and the Balance of Power,” in End of Empire: The 
Demise of the Soviet Union, ed. G.R. Urban (Washington, D.C.: The American University Press, 
1993); Edward W. Walker, Dissolution: Sovereignty and the Breakup of the Soviet Union (Berkeley: 
Berkeley Public Policy Press, 2003); Wisła Suraska, How the Soviet Union Disappeared (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 1998).  Suraska analyzes several contributing factors to the Soviet Union’s 
dissolution, though I am citing it here in the capacity that it details the rise of nationalism like 
the majority of other works.
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outlined upon his ascent to power.236  In this same vein, Elie Kedourie argues that 
Stalinism is what held the Soviet Republics together, and that with Gorbachev’s 
de-Stalinization, the Republics turned to nationalism and the Union dissolved.237 
 The claim that Stalin is responsible for the state of the Soviet Union that 
Gorbachev inherited is a valid one.  A brief survey of Soviet history supports this 
argument.  Stalin’s legacy includes the bureaucratization of the Soviet Union, 
and the militarization of Soviet society and foreign policy under a totalitarian 
state.  While centralization of state controls may have been justified in his own 
time by the need to industrialize and the inevitability of preparing for and 
fighting the Second World War, Stalin established precedents that persisted in 
Soviet leadership well beyond his death.238  Perhaps one of the most damaging 
legacies of Stalin is the defense-first mindset he initiated.  Due to what he saw 
as capitalist (and during the Second World War, fascist) encirclement, Stalin 
devoted the majority of the country’s resources and capabilities to preparing 
for what he saw as an inevitable war.  This resulted in a centralized system of 
state command that permeated not only economics, but also political and 
social life with the Communist Party (and all too often, Stalin himself ) as 
the sole source of authority.239  Having the country on a perpetual war-path 
against ideological “enemies,” internal and external, meant the justification of 
suppressing political opponents, the direct control of the Soviet Union’s still 
budding industrial system, and an openly hostile foreign policy.  All aspects 
of life, social, economic, and intellectual, were politicized and directed by the 
state and its narrow interpretation of Marxist-Leninist ideology.
  Following the death of Stalin, attempts were made by Nikita Khrushchev to 
reduce spending on the military, increase the quality and quantity of consumer 
products, and adapt Soviet policy to the new social and economic realities 
of the post-war world.240  While the Khrushchev era did indeed see a thaw 
in international relations and some internal social and economic reforms, 
Communist Party conservatives led by Leonid Brezhnev ultimately ousted 
him from power, returning to heavy-handed Stalinist style governance.  As 
236  Sternthal, Gorbachev’s Reforms, 3.
237  Kedourie, “Nationalism and the Balance of Power,” 104.
238  Sternthal, Gorbachev’s Reforms, 6.
239  Ibid., 7.
240  Ibid.
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historian Yuri Afanasyev states, regarding the period between Khrushchev and 
Gorbachev, “The intellectual and ideological stagnation of those years was worse 
than the economic stagnation.”241  Stalin’s heavily centralized and bureaucratic 
party and government had effectively transcended his own death, reforms of 
his successor, and remained the status quo of the Soviet system for another 20 
years until Mikhail Gorbachev introduced plans for far-reaching and radical 
changes.
 Outside of the Gorbachev-focused writing and the writing dealing more 
directly with the collapse of the Soviet Union, there are authors that make 
arguments that are undoubtedly in the minority.  A particularly interesting, 
though highly dubious claim is that the reforms themselves were nothing but 
propaganda, designed to gain Western financial aid for an already collapsing 
system.242  While propaganda did feature heavily in the portrayals of perestroika 
and glasnost, the idea that the reforms themselves were part of some ploy to 
trick the West out of a full victory in the Cold War is laughable.  It ignores the 
complex nature of both propaganda and the reforms.
 The vast majority of propaganda studies revolve around the analysis of psy-
chological techniques and rhetorical devices propagandists utilize in their craft, 
and suffer from a definition of propaganda that lends little to more sophisticated 
scholarship.  These types of writing typically result in lists of notable tactics, 
case studies detailing multiple historical examples, and methods readers can 
employ to challenge propaganda when they encounter it.  Scholars who have 
published works to this effect include D. Lincoln Harter, Edward L. Bernays, 
and Karen Dovring.243  Studies of this type exist for the explicit purpose of 
exploring propaganda for its own sake, as a standalone phenomenon.  They 
241  Yuri Afanasyev, “The Agony of the Stalinist System,” in Voices of Glasnost: Interviews with 
Gorbachev’s Reformers, ed. Stephen F. Cohen and Katrina vanden Heuvel (New York: W.W. Norton 
and Co., 1989), 97.
242  Marian Leighton, Soviet Propaganda as a Foreign Policy Tool (New York: Freedom House, 
1991), 99-127.
243  Edward L. Bernays, Propaganda (New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 1928); Karin 
Dovring, Road of Propaganda: The Semantics of Biased Communication (New York: Philosophical 
Library, Inc., 1959); D. Lincoln Harter, Propaganda Handbook (Philadelphia: Twentieth Century 
Publishing Company, 1953).  Harter even begins his work with a list of “77 techniques” that are 
common, and refers to the psychological basis of each and how they have been used in the past.  This 
is rather typical of books of this type, exploring little beyond the techniques a propagandist utilizes.
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view propaganda as a tool for those in power who wish to deliberately and 
maliciously alter the beliefs of others through deception and hidden agendas.244 
This oversimplification is incredibly problematic when studying propaganda 
for application in the field of history.  It ignores the society from which the 
propaganda emerges, and pigeonholes those who use propaganda as evil, creat-
ing moral judgments that are generally to be avoided in the writing of good 
history.  
 One scholar that takes a more sophisticated approach in his work with 
propaganda is Jacques Ellul. Ellul was a French academic, writing in fields that 
spanned psychology, sociology, political science, and theology.  A common theme 
featured throughout his varied writings is society’s relationship with technology 
and the social power that comes along with technological power.  His focus on 
social phenomena in relation to cultural and political power structures features 
heavily in his work Propaganda: The Formation of Men’s Attitudes.245 Ellul’s 
Propaganda represents a distinct break from previous studies of the field, viewing 
propaganda as a symptom of mass societies, rather than an intentional creation. 
He states that to “delineate the real dimensions of propaganda we must always 
consider it within the context of civilization.”246  Previous analyses did little of 
this, relegating propaganda to a role in which it acts only as the tool of advertisers 
and despots.  He goes on to write, “Propaganda is a good deal less the political 
weapon of regimes (it is that also) than the effect of a technological society that 
embraces the entire man and tends to be a completely integrated society.”247 
Here, Ellul makes clear that his take on propaganda is far more nuanced than 
that of his predecessors.  He views propaganda more as an unintentional result 
of modern society, rather than something it deliberately creates.  In this way, 
propaganda can be seen as in indicator of a society in which the state permeates 
multiple facets of life; in Ellul’s own words, a “completely integrated society.” 
“Propaganda must be seen as situated at the center of the growing powers of the 
244  Eugen Hadamovsky, Propaganda and National Power, trans. Alice Mavrogordato and Ilse 
De Witt (1933; repr., New York: Arno Press, 1972); William Hummel, The Analysis of Propaganda 
(New York: William Sloane Associates, Inc., 1949). 
245  Jacques Ellul, Propaganda: The Formantion of Men’s Attitudes (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1965).
246  Ibid., xvii.
247  Ibid.
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State and governmental and administrative techniques.”248  Further reiterating 
and expanding on his argument, Ellul holds that as a state develops power and 
expands its role in society, propaganda is a natural byproduct.
 Ellul’s assertion that one must examine the social landscape to better un-
derstand propaganda is echoed in the discipline of history.  One historian 
whose ideas fit well with this idea of understanding the society producing the 
propaganda is Moshe Lewin.  Lewin, a noted scholar of Russian and Soviet 
history, holds that to properly understand the Soviet Union, one must exam-
ine the social forces at work within it.249 It is not sufficient to simply view the 
Soviet system as a government in control of its citizens.  Lewin states that “one 
needs to work from a conceptualization of the state that allows one to grasp 
the connections between the political and other areas of social life.”250  This 
type of view is especially important when examining the media produced by 
the Soviet Union for the Western capitalist world.  It is of limited use to label 
propaganda of any type, Soviet included, as a mere tool of the state.  As with any 
aspect of government or political systems, the social forces behind propaganda 
and state-produced media must be thoroughly examined and analyzed to truly 
arrive at an understanding of how it functions.
 The ways in which the Soviet Union depicted its own national project of 
restructuring, when viewed in conjunction with Ellul’s theories, give valuable 
insight to Soviet society.  As the media in the Soviet Union was state owned and 
directed, newspapers and periodicals coming out of the USSR reflect the official 
program of the Soviet government and the Communist Party—supreme forces 
in nearly every aspect of Soviet life at the time.  While a study of material pub-
lished for Soviet audiences is ideal, the author encounters a significant language 
barrier preventing work with original Russian language sources.  However, it 
is possible to operate around this problem by examining Soviet publications 
printed in English.  This naturally leads to the questioning of just how similar 
the content of Russian language publications is to those written in English.  By 
looking at material that has been translated from the domestic Soviet press of 
the reform period and comparing it with English language pieces of the same 
248  Ibid., xviii.
249  Lewin, The Gorbachev Phenomenon, 7.
250  Ibid.
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time, it can be determined that the views expressed are indeed consistent with 
each other.251  In fact, pieces printed in English language Soviet publications 
were often listed as coming from newspapers and magazines circulating in the 
Soviet Union, though obviously in translation.  These realities firmly establish 
the validity of examining English language publications as a means to explore 
Soviet print media regarding the reforms.  For the sake of this paper, the monthly 
magazines Soviet Life and Sputnik will be used because of their close correlation 
to works translated directly from Russian sources, as well as their inclusion of 
pieces also read by Soviet audiences, allowing them to function to a certain 
degree as substitutes for domestic, Russian language sources.  Evaluating the 
content of the pieces found within these magazines using Ellul’s propaganda 
theories will shed light upon the society that produced them, expanding our 
understanding of the perestroika and glasnost reforms and how they affected 
the Soviet Union.
 Representations of the perestroika and glasnost reforms in the Soviet English 
language media fit the criteria for propaganda as established by Jacques Ellul on 
multiple levels, thus revealing the centralized nature of the Soviet State and its 
supreme power in society.  The specific categories these works of propaganda can 
be classified into and the psychological methods they utilize further illustrate 
the character and intent of the reforms beyond their face values and reflect 
the foundations that Soviet society was built on.  As the reforms progressed, 
pieces found in Soviet media began to drift farther from the characteristics 
of propaganda, increasingly resembling more independent journalism and 
works of opinion until the ultimate dissolution of the Soviet state.  This shift 
represents the successful implementation of certain aspects of the perestroika 
and glasnost reforms, while simultaneously signifying their ultimate failure in 
revitalizing the Soviet Union at all levels.  The failure of the Soviet government 
to create the society that it promised to its citizens resulted in the abandonment 
251  Isaac J. Tarasulo, Gorbachev and Glasnost: Viewpoints from the Soviet Press (Wilmington: 
Scholarly Resources Inc., 1989).  This volume provides a great number of Soviet news articles 
published in translation.  They are taken from various Soviet domestic newspapers and magazines 
and organized by subject matter.  The pieces regarding perestroika are incredibly consistent with 
the types of statements made in Soviet Life and Sputnik, justifying my use of those magazines as 
representative of the Soviet press of the time.  Perhaps the largest difference in content is found 
in the treatment of Soviet pop culture, detailed much more in the domestic articles than those 
destined for foreign readers,which tend to focus on fine arts and traditional culture.
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of the social foundations that were used to advance the reform programs in 
propaganda, resulting in the collapse of Soviet state power.
A Social Approach
When working within Ellul’s framework and a basic knowledge of Soviet his-
tory, one can easily understand why propaganda existed at the time Gorbachev 
took power and why it continued to exist at the inception of the perestroika 
and glasnost reforms.  Gorbachev inherited a political system and society still 
operating under the Stalinist structure of state controls.  As Ellul stated, pro-
paganda is a natural phenomenon that results from such completely integrated 
and centralized societies.  Though Gorbachev’s reforms aimed to restructure the 
state completely and reduce the authoritarian influence it exerted over citizens’ 
lives, the fact remains that he and his reformers were emerging from and working 
within a society already shaped by 50 years of supreme state power.   It may seem 
counter-intuitive that a state would develop propaganda to initiate a process of 
decreasing state controls, however, the reforms were themselves state-organized 
programs.  As acts of policy, they would be powerless and ineffective without 
the support of the public and a drive towards the active participation of the 
masses.  This returns us to what Ellul holds as the one shared characteristic of all 
forms of propaganda: a will to action.252  The social circumstances necessary for 
propaganda to exist already long in place, Gorbachev and his fellow reformers 
utilized the existing state media infrastructure to promote and advance their 
agenda of restructuring and openness with the public.
 It is important to pause at this juncture and establish the nature of propa-
ganda.  The term, through decades of simplistic interpretations, has achieved 
an extremely negative connotation.  Propaganda is often seen by the general 
public as an inherently malicious effort to distort the truth (or lie outright) 
and bring about the propagandist’s ulterior or dubious motives by altering 
what individuals believe.  However, this view is flawed on several levels.  First, 
propaganda need not be malicious, nor need it contain lies.  As stated above, 
the one primary piece of criteria that determines whether or not something is 
propaganda is the will to action.  The ethical value of the action itself is not 
relevant to the label of propaganda.  This connects to the second issue with the 
common misinterpretation of propaganda: it does not need to alter what an 
252  Ellul, Propaganda, x.
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individual believes, but only move them towards action.  Ellul calls this seeking 
orthopraxy rather than orthodoxy.253
 Having established the validity of this particular theoretical framework of 
propaganda in relation to the state of society in the 1980s Soviet Union and 
the basic implications it has on the definition of propaganda, we can begin 
to look at more specific applications of the theory within Soviet publications 
produced for the West.  While Ellul largely attempts to avoid outlining specific 
techniques of propaganda, he does outline different types of propaganda and 
the characteristics they demonstrate.254  Exploring which characteristics are 
present within the pieces of propaganda produced to advance reform not only 
further validate their labeling as propaganda, but in turn add the understanding 
of the reforms themselves and what their intended goals were.
Overt vs. Covert Propaganda: The Novosti Story
One distinction that Ellul draws is between covert and overt propaganda.255  The 
names themselves leave little to the imagination.  Covert propaganda actively 
hides its aims and that it is intended to influence or push its audience towards 
a given action.256  The other side of the situation is overt propaganda.  Overt 
propaganda does little or nothing to hide its source, and the actions it hopes 
to elicit are made clear.  Official propaganda ministries are a key identifying 
factor for overt propaganda.
 Soviet Life and Sputnik, the periodicals that this study is focused on, cer-
tainly fit within the definition of overt propaganda.  Though intended to be 
magazines that showcase Soviet current events and culture, there was never 
any doubt that they were works of propaganda.  Part of this classification 
stems from the fact that both of these journals (as well as many others) were 
published by Novosti.  Agentstvo Pechanti Novosti (Novosti Press Agency, or 
simply Novosti for short) was created in 1961 with the stated goal of publishing 
“magazines, newspapers, and brochures designed to acquaint foreign readers 
with the Soviet Union,” amongst other similar domestic duties.257  While this 
may sound innocent enough, the reality of Novosti’s formation and activities 
253  Ibid., 27.
254  Ibid., 6-84. 
255  Ibid.,15.
256  Ibid.
257  Baruch A. Hazan, Soviet Propaganda: A Case Study of the Middle East Conflict (Jerusalem: 
Keter Publishing House, 1976), 49.
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are quite revealing of its true function.  The founders of Novosti came from 
several other Soviet organizations, public in name, but working within state 
sanctions.  Members of the Union of Journalists, the Union of Writers, the 
Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Contacts with Foreign 
Countries, the National Union for the Dissemination of Political and Scientific 
Knowledge, and other similar groups had a hand in the foundation and man-
agement of the agency, which was in turn staffed with intelligence officers and 
graduates of KGB courses.258  While these groups had no official government 
connection, the state of society did not allow for independent bodies to exist 
without governmental approval.  All publications were property of the people 
(the Communist Party), and journalists were hand-picked and expected to 
conform with and adhere to the party line.  It is for this reason, although not 
directly state sponsored, that Novosti can be considered as an organ of the 
Soviet government with propaganda production as its chief goal.  The manner 
in which these facts differ from the stated purpose may lead observers to classify 
Novosti as a producer of covert propaganda, however the state of the Soviet 
press was no secret, and publications coming directly from Novosti carried with 
them the stigma of state and party sponsorship.
 An example of the close ties between Novosti and the Soviet state in the 
Gorbachev era can be found in one of its board chairmen, Valentin Falin. 
Elected to his position by the Council of Sponsors (leading members of the 
aforementioned groups and unions) in March of 1986, Falin’s biography is very 
telling of the types of individuals that controlled Novosti.  Graduating from 
the Moscow Institute of International Relations in 1950, Falin held various 
executive posts within the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs.259  From 1971-
1979 he served as Soviet Ambassador to West Germany, as first deputy head of 
a department in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Central Committee 
from 1978-1983, and was awarded the Order of the October Revolution, three 
Orders of the Red Banner of Labor, and other medals for his service to the 
state and Communist Party.260  This lifetime of government work and intimate 
connection with the Communist Party, publicly stated, only furthers the charge 
that Novosti was overtly producing propaganda, though without explicitly 
labeling itself as such. 
258  Ibid.
259  “Valentin Falin Elected Chairman of APN Board,” Soviet Life, May 1986, 29.
260  Ibid.
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 Soviet Life in particular leaves no doubt as to the overt nature of its propa-
ganda.  Published from 1956-1991, Soviet Life was part of an agreement between 
the Soviet and American governments to allow for the limited distribution of 
specific periodicals in each other’s countries (the American equivalent being 
Amerika magazine).261  Soviet Life’s successor journal, Russian Life claims that 
while the magazines were intended to contain general interest pieces from the 
country of production, there was never a doubt that both functioned as medi-
ums for the distribution of propaganda.262  The presence of such an agreement 
between the two governments is itself an indicator that each party recognized 
the reality of the situation.  
 The propaganda coming out of Novosti was not limited to English language 
materials.  Novosti was truly a massive agency.  Publications were produced for 
more than 110 countries, with official representatives present in 82 of them 
maintaining connections with 140 major international news agencies.263  Some 
of their materials were published in multiple languages, while others were 
specifically targeting particular languages and nationalities.  For instance, the 
newspaper New Times was printed in Russian, English, Spanish, German, French, 
and Arabic, containing broad-based stories and news coverage.264 Other publica-
tions including Far Eastern Affairs (printed in Russian, English and Japanese), 
The Land of the Soviets (Syria), Al-Magallya (Egypt), and Fakel (Hungary) were 
comprised of material specific to the region or culture in question.265  Novosti’s 
gargantuan international scope, combined with its state-approved structure is 
further testament to the fact that it was indeed a propaganda house and not a 
simple news agency.
Vertical vs. Horizontal Propaganda: A Call to Action from Above
The voice developed in works of propaganda produces the next key distinction 
that Ellul makes: vertical vs. horizontal propaganda.  Vertical propaganda is, as 
its name implies, top-down in orientation.  The speaker is usually an authority 
figure or someone “in the know” acting from a superior position of power.266 
261  “About Russian Life: Our History,” Russian Life Magazine, accessed March 6, 2013, http://
www.russianlife.com/about/.
262  Ibid.
263  Hazan, Soviet Propaganda, 49.
264  Ibid., 55.
265  Ibid.
266  Ellul, Propaganda, 80.
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This is the standard form of propaganda that comes to mind in most discussions 
of the subject, representative of Nazi German, Stalinist, or American propa-
ganda.  The other, more uncommon type of propaganda in regards to voice is 
horizontal propaganda.  Horizontal propaganda comes from sources within a 
given group and is directed towards a society where all members are (in theory 
at least) equal in standing and knowledge.267  A propagandist in horizontal 
systems acts more as a facilitator for discussion rather than from a position of 
power, guiding his targets towards the intended action.  According to Ellul, 
this type of propaganda was found within Maoist China, where members of 
the Communist Party were planted in various social groups, slowly influencing 
said groups from inside.268
 The propaganda of the perestroika and glasnost reforms is markedly vertical 
in its orientation.  Speeches from leading government officials, often Gorbachev 
himself, and pieces written by various academics in high posts calling for re-
form, qualifying the necessity for change, or projecting the expected benefits 
of the new course are very common.  This coincides with the top-down nature 
of the reforms themselves, as well as the media used to transmit information 
about them.  Had the movement been from the masses or a faction within 
the government not backed by Gorbachev, it is highly unlikely that positive 
information regarding them would be found in party-backed sources like Soviet 
Life or Sputnik.  As perestroika and glasnost were created and directed by the 
government, it only makes sense that the most enthusiastic advocates of the 
programs would be found within the government and associated bodies.
 Soviet Life often published excerpts and summaries of various official speeches 
given by Gorbachev regarding his proposed courses of action and the benefits 
he claimed they would hold.  These are clear examples of vertical propaganda, 
coming from the head of the Soviet state directed towards not only his own 
citizens but the world as a whole.  The May 1986 issue of Soviet Life published 
a summary of General Secretary Gorbachev’s political report speech given on 
February 25, 1986 to the Twenty-Seventh Congress of the Communist Party of 
the Soviet Union, titling it “We Look to the Future Confidently”; itself a quote 
from the speech.269  “’Accelerating the country’s socioeconomic development is 
267  Ibid., 81.
268  Ibid., 82.
269  “Mikhail Gorbachev, ‘We Look to the Future Confidently…,’” Soviet Life, May 1986, 3.
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the key to solving all our problems—immediate and long-term, economic and 
social, political and ideological, internal and external.  It is the only way our 
society can and must achieve a qualitatively new stage.’”270  Gorbachev acknowl-
edges wide-spread problems within his country, and proposes his newly-revealed 
plans for reform as the sole path to correcting them and moving into the future. 
As leader of the USSR, he urges the population towards participating in the 
process, and for foreign listeners/readers to accept his reforms as positive for all 
mankind.  At the conclusion of the piece, Gorbachev is paraphrased as assuring 
his audience that “The Communists and the entire Soviet people support the 
party’s policy of accelerating the country’s socioeconomic development and its 
Program’s clear orientation toward communist construction and world peace.”271 
Here Gorbachev has qualified his reforms by using his authority as head of the 
Communist Party to his advantage, giving them the blessing of the party and 
by proxy, the public as a whole.  Though the reforms aimed to reduce this type 
of authoritarian directive, the fact remains that the Communist Party was, at 
this early stage of reform, still accepted as the representative of all citizens; a 
piece of the Stalinist legacy.
 Outside of Gorbachev’s own speeches, other high-ranking individuals were 
commonly featured in Soviet Life writing about the necessity for restructuring 
and outlining how their fields would be affected.  Many of these individuals are 
academics and professors, primarily from the fields of economics and sociology. 
As leading scholars in their fields, they are utilizing their titles and positions to 
add weight and authority to their interpretations.  Doctor of Economics from 
the Central Economic and Mathematical Institute of the USSR Academy of 
Sciences Natalya Rimashevskaya is featured as writing, “the program provides for 
improving working conditions and remuneration, increasing the consumption 
fund, giving more assistance to large families, reviewing pension arrangements 
and retail prices, improving housing conditions and health services, and further 
developing education, culture, art and the mass media.”272   Sociologist Tatyana 
Zaslavskaya, also a member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, is featured 
several times in Soviet Life throughout the Gorbachev period.  Her assessments 
concern the development of society as a whole, rather than specific economic 
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goals.  In a March 1988 interview with Soviet Life, Zaslavskaya is asked if she as 
a sociologist can guarantee that perestroika will be successful in bringing about 
positive changes for the Soviet Union.  She answers, “The result will depend on 
the choice of virtually every member of society…a consistent democratization 
of all spheres of public life is under way—a process that could become the main 
factor of success.”273 The open support of academics like Rimashevskaya and 
Zaslavskaya is crucial to the public mobilization behind perestroika.  As experts 
in their respective fields, their statements are received with more credibility by 
the public.  
 More meaningful for foreign audiences who may not necessarily be in-
fluenced by Soviet politicians and academics are the experiences of people 
who are on the ground experiencing the changes themselves.  Well aware of 
the distrust many Westerners felt towards anyone directly associated with the 
Soviet government, Soviet Life printed articles by friendly, relatable individuals 
lending indirect support to the government programs through the reporting of 
their everyday observations.  While they may not hold official titles or positions 
of importance, accounts from these individuals, especially when published in 
a magazine like Soviet Life can be considered vertical propaganda.  They are 
directed from someone who can be considered “in the know” in relation to 
foreign readers that have no tangible connection to the reforms taking place. 
An example of this type of vertical propaganda can be found in the October 
1987 piece “Moscow-Center of Change”.274  Mike Davidow, an individual 
given no formal introduction and taking a familiar tone, relays his observa-
tions of perestroika Moscow.  Davidow lauds the vibrancy of the local bazaars, 
noting how full of life everyone is and the festive atmosphere surrounding the 
community.  He writes that this jubilant affair is the direct result of the fact 
that collective farms and co-ops are now allowed to sell their surplus products 
independently (a piece of the perestroika reforms) and are thus alleviating the 
food shortages that once plagued the city.275  Davidow’s claims are substantiated 
by the fact that he is on the scene, bearing witness to the changes in progress. 
Works such as Davidow’s act as support for the politicians, policy makers, and 
academics that promised such improvements would occur.
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Irrational vs. Rational Propaganda: Ideals Put into Action
Ellul differentiates pieces propaganda into two more classes based the type 
of appeals they use to encourage action: irrational and rational.  Irrational 
propaganda is made to excite the audience, speaking with great passion and 
emotion often about lofty ideals or principles with no statistical grounding.276 
Rational propaganda on the other hand, makes heavy use of facts, figures and 
statistics to appeal to the man’s favorable view of verifiable information and 
illustrate the successes or failures of a course of action.277  Here, it is important 
to again emphasize that propaganda need not be lies.  A piece of propaganda 
may be 100% factual information, but conveyed in a manner that demands 
support and action.  
 The propaganda of perestroika and glasnost contains both rational and ir-
rational elements, revealing the comprehensive nature of their goals.  Irrational 
pieces make use of concepts like democracy, social justice, and promises of a 
new age in the Soviet Union.  The rational pieces use statistics and reports to 
underscore where the past system has fallen short, and illuminate where the 
new course has been successful.  Utilized together, these two types of appeals 
paint a picture of a society undergoing a complete transformation of ideology 
and infrastructure.  The irrational and the rational support each other—one 
laying out the ideological basis of the reforms, the other providing tangible and 
calculable evidence of their necessity and successes.
 Given the ideological shifts that perestroika and glasnost were working 
towards, irrational propaganda served to excite the public with ideals of the 
inherent “goodness” of the new system.   One theme that is featured quite 
often is that of social justice.  The idea of a just and moral society in which 
social conditions do not limit opportunity or the ability to achieve one’s goals 
is upheld as a proud Soviet tradition, albeit one that is still being perfected and 
brought to a reality.278 The attainment of social justice and equality is lifted 
up as the supreme goal of reform.  Readers are assured that the actions taking 
place before them have this in mind, and that the Communist Party will do 
everything it can to advance the principle.279 
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 Perestroika was made to look appealing in that it was to usher in a new age 
of prosperity and socialist enlightenment.  It was throwing off the shackles of 
previous ideological stagnation, and proceeding with the development of new 
ideas in light of modern realities.  One individual who made this claim very 
clear was Boris Krotkov, editor-in-chief of Sputnik.  At the beginning of each 
issue, Krotkov writes a letter to his readers giving his (and consequently, the 
Party’s) take on the current state of affairs in the Soviet Union.  His style is a 
perfect example of irrational propaganda, promising a brighter future in the 
wake of reform.  “We want more socialism.  But we need socialism constantly 
renovating, capable of being in the vanguard of human civilization...and not 
for some abstract prestige, but for the sake of each and every one [sic.] of us. 
For the sake of me, my children and grandchildren, their bright future, the 
road to which was opened by the October Revolution.”280  Krotkov offers no 
specifics, rather relying on the broad appeal of a promising tomorrow shaped 
by ideological developments.
 Though emotional appeals such as Krotkov’s are quite common in material 
emerging from this period, there are an even greater number of pieces with a 
focus on justifying perestroika with hard facts and statistics.   Wage levels, in-
dustrial production statistics, and efficiency reports are among the vast number 
of figures thrown at readers in these types of articles.  These reflect the fact that a 
major portion of perestroika’s reforms were economic, and as such, changes could 
be quantified and judged accordingly.  Problems with past economic planning 
were accompanied with the statistic that the industrial output growth rate in 
1982 was 50% below the average of the growth rate for the previous five-year 
planning period.281  The economics of the Uzbek Republic were cast in a dismal 
light by listing that industrial capacity had been underused for the preceding 
20 years, leaving goals for growth rates and economic targets unmet.282 A 60% 
decline in the growth of the national income of the USSR from 1971-1986 
was noted, naturally alongside calls for change.283 These numerical revelations 
direct readers to one conclusion: the old system has failed.   When the ideology 
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and policy no longer produce quantifiable success, people are bound to seek 
an alternative—namely, perestroika.
 The economic effects of perestroika, or rather the state of the economy 
during the perestroika reforms, were also made public via statistics.  Surely, 
readers are to believe, any improvements in production or efficiency could 
be attributed to the numerous changes brought about in economic policy. 
Industrial production is listed as having increased by 4.4% and agricultural 
production by 3% between 1985 and 1986.284  Use of “progressive” technolo-
gies was to be expanded by 50-100%.285  These statistics are not published to 
be remembered by readers.  What is important is the overall impression they 
create.  With growth numbers positive and goals set high for the future, readers 
gather that things must be looking up, paying no mind to what “progressive” 
technologies may be or just how closely the recorded growth rates correspond 
with previous plans.  What is remembered is that they were shown numbers, 
and that the numbers looked promising.
  The scope of the perestroika and glasnost reforms is much better understood 
when utilizing the framework of rational vs. irrational propaganda.  Both types 
were featured heavily, representing the multi-faceted nature of the reforms 
themselves.  On one hand, there was to be a massive shift in ideology, bringing 
about a new era of justice and prosperity.  On the other, these ideas were to be 
concrete, manifesting themselves in improved production that could be seen 
on paper or in the factories.
Lenin and Stalin as Symbols
While Ellul is careful to establish that propaganda is not solely the manipula-
tion of symbols for a psychological effect, he stipulates that symbols can be 
manipulated within a propaganda system to provoke action.286  In order for a 
symbol to be manipulated effectively, it must first be ingrained within a soci-
ety.  Once the symbol has been properly established and elevated through the 
pre-education of a society, it can be called upon to serve the purposes of the 
propagandist.287  The manipulation of revered or hated concepts or individuals 
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provokes reflexive actions in those who have been taught to feel a certain way 
about them.
 Within the Soviet Union, there was no symbol more respected than that of 
Vladimir Lenin.  The architect of the October Revolution, Lenin’s status was 
elevated to that of an immortal sage, accessible through his writings and his 
embalmed body that rests in its Red Square mausoleum.288  The cult of Lenin 
is something unmatched in Western society.  During the October Revolution 
and following his death, Lenin grew from being a political theorist into an 
abstraction of all that was possible for the people of the Soviet Union.289  The 
veneration of Lenin was by no means consistent in its intensity.  However, it 
endured usurpation and corruption by the personality cult of Josef Stalin, was 
revitalized to an extent by Nikita Khrushchev, only to again be relegated to 
half-heartedly celebrated state holidays in the following decades.290  Though 
the Soviet concept of Lenin was not always at the forefront of political life, it 
managed to maintain its character relative to the revolution and the benevolent 
and all-wise status Lenin was elevated to.  The enduring power of Lenin as a 
symbol of the purity of his ideology and goodwill in the Soviet Union made 
his identity and the myths surrounding him a natural target for manipulation.
 The possibility of using Lenin as a symbol was by no means ignored by 
proponents of the perestroika and glasnost reforms.  Once again, Lenin was 
used to justify the new course of action proposed for the Soviet Union; his writ-
ings being cited as a source of inspiration for reform and new policies labeled 
as a continuation of his work.  All Soviet citizens were imbibed with a deep 
appreciation and respect for Lenin’s accomplishments and theories, and align-
ing one’s platform with that of Lenin was a sure method to achieve a reflexive 
action from the public.
 A piece of Leninist theory that proved vital to the promoters of perestroika 
was the view that society must adapt to practical realities, updating its approaches 
to face issues that previous theorists, Lenin included, could not possibly foresee. 
Gorbachev’s use of a Lenin quote is explained in a Soviet Life piece when he 
repeated, “’When the situation has changed and different problems have to be 
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solved, we cannot look back and attempt to solve them by yesterday’s methods. 
Don’t try—you won’t succeed.’”291  With this general notion justifying the drive 
toward reform, other more specific elements of Lenin’s writing and life were used 
to direct the changes.   The openness and critical nature of glasnost could be 
aligned with Lenin’s claim that “our strength lies in stating the truth,” and the 
war against bureaucracy justified by the importance Lenin placed on reducing 
bureaucracy in times that were see great changes.292  These congruencies were 
not held to be coincidences, nor should they be.  They represent an attempt to 
return to classical Leninist theories uncorrupted by the Stalinist system, and 
updating them as per Lenin’s own advice. Using Lenin as a symbol was not 
simply an attempt to gain public support for a new course, but the result of a 
society that had been conditioned to look to him for answers.   In Gorbachev’s 
own words, “It is precisely…in Lenin’s spirit that we acted at our congress.  It 
is precisely in this way that we are going to act in the future as well.”293
 While Lenin was used as a symbol of pursing a progressive socialist society 
through reinterpretation and creative thinking, the image of Stalin was utilized 
to personify the ills that faced the Soviet Union at the time of reform.  We have 
already established the general character of Stalin’s additions to the Soviet system, 
and this history was not lost on Gorbachev and the other reformers.  There were 
few in the Soviet Union whose families were not harmed by Stalinism.294  In 
the propaganda of the late 1980s, Stalin’s influence was typically portrayed as 
repressive, centralizing, and instrumental in bringing about the authoritarian 
management system that was to be reformed (a valid representation, as estab-
lished in earlier sections).295  “The vast majority of deviations from socialism, 
many of which have not yet been overcome, emerged in Stalin’s time…Stalinism 
implies mass terror, contempt for human life, the massacre of millions of in-
nocent people on political grounds.”296  While it is historical fact that Stalin 
did shape the Soviet Union in this way, the real interest lies in how Stalin was 
directly associated with the problems reformers were facing.  By directly link-
ing the pre-perestroika system to Stalin and his legacy of terror, these pieces 
create the reflexive desire to distance oneself from the old ways.  In the West, 
291  Pyotr Mikhailov, “Leninist Rethinking,” Soviet Life, May 1986, 7.
292  Ibid.
293  “Closing Speech By Mikhail Gorbachev,” Soviet Life, May 1986, 5.
294  Sternthal, Gorbachev’s Reforms, 1.
295  “Party Conferences: Pages of History,” Soviet Life, July 1988, 9.
296  “’Stalin is my Idol!,’” Soviet Life, January 1989, 29.
Matthew Brown
109
where Stalin is usually depicted as the ultimate evil of the Soviet Union, this 
correlation had potential to be very successful in winning the support of many 
Americans. 
 The combination of Lenin (an already revered figure) as a symbol of correct 
socialist ideology and Stalin (feared and hated by many in the Soviet Union 
and abroad) as the source of socioeconomic ills reveals an interesting side of 
the perestroika and glasnost reforms.  The reforms seized upon the collective 
senses of success and failure.  Reformers recognized where they believed their 
country had deviated from its founding principles, and turned their focus to 
the success of Lenin’s October Revolution as a way of mitigating the damage 
and continuing on what they believed to be the correct path.  The propaganda 
reflecting this duality of Soviet leadership was not a planned out tactic as more 
rudimentary studies may conclude, but an organic result of the social fabric 
and history of the Soviet Union at the time.
Changing Coverage: No Direction but Down
As the Soviet Union continued down the labored and uncertain path towards 
democratization, there are certain shifts visible within the content of Soviet Life 
and Sputnik.  The materials presented in the publications drifted farther from 
the criteria used to define propaganda.  Beginning in 1989 and lasting through 
the official dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, articles being 
to appear that do not contain the same drive towards action found in earlier 
pieces.  Rather than suggesting a correct path or reassuring the population that 
the present hardships are in the service of future benefits, questions about the 
future of the Soviet Union are brought up and left open-ended.  The questioning 
of reforms begins somewhat modestly, but as time goes on the dissatisfaction 
intensifies.  By early 1991, certain articles openly express distaste with all things 
coming from the government with great exasperation.  
 In December of 1989, Soviet Life printed an article titled “Unemployment: 
Avoiding the Pitfalls”.297  The piece almost acts as an introduction to the word 
“unemployment” and its implications, as until the perestroika reforms, there 
had been full employment in the USSR.  The root of the massive levels of 
unemployment (primarily in Central Asia and the Caucasus region) is held to 
be the self-financing of all factories and plants.  The article states that because 
these production facilities are no longer state supported, they have reduced 
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costs by eliminating superfluous workers.  The article goes on to say that if the 
Soviet Union desires economic recovery, the “myth” of full employment needs 
to be done away with.  A question is asked of readers in the final lines: “What 
should be done to ease the situation, to avoid pitfalls, and to guarantee and 
safeguard our citizens’ right to work?”298
 Interestingly, the piece gives no hypothetical solutions.  In earlier issues, 
this type of question would warrant a lengthy reply, thick with hopes of a bet-
ter future at the expense of today.  However, progress is no longer the task at 
hand.  The question asks what can be done to ease the situation and safeguard 
citizens, not advance their causes.  This piece cannot be considered propaganda, 
as it does not suggest or lead towards any specific action, but rather asks readers 
“what can be done?”  It openly labels full employment, previously a key feature 
of the Soviet economy and a point of pride, as a “myth.”
 Two months later in February 1990, and piece entitled “Socialism: Where 
is it headed?” was published in Soviet Life.299 The article begins by praising 
the enthusiasm with which Warsaw Pact countries of Eastern Europe have 
embraced perestroika and the spirit of change that comes with it.  After this 
optimistic introduction, the tone of the writing becomes more questioning of 
the Soviet Union’s allies.  The author, Nikolai Shishlin questions the direction 
the countries will go in with their reforms.  He lists three possible views on the 
further development of “socialist community” within these states.  The first is 
that socialism is dead and that the only future is in a return to a “bourgeois-
democratic” system.  The second is that socialist democracy will take hold and 
that Stalinist interpretations will be defeated.  The third possible outcome is that 
“revolutionary” changes will take place and “cleanse” the socialist ideal.  Shishlin 
concludes that all three opinions have the right to exist, that no single course 
can be suggested, and that everyone should be prepared for more unpleasant 
surprises.  Finally, he ends by making an appeal to the right of free choice of 
government and encourages cooperation.
 This type of writing would be completely alien in Soviet Life were it published 
a year earlier.  Even entertaining the fact that socialism may be dead without 
responding with a voracious attack on all possible angles would be next to sac-
rilege.  Like the article before it, this one makes no suggestion as to the course 
the states it discusses should take.  Granted, it does call for cooperation and 
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freedom to choose one’s own government, but these goals presented without 
the ideological components of previous pieces are nothing more than a hope 
for any form of stability.
 Representing the most extreme move away from the classification of pro-
paganda is an article written by Yuri Grafsky titled “In Search of an Economic 
Strategy.”300  Printed in the February 1991 edition of Soviet Life (1991 was the 
final year Soviet Life would be published), the article takes a scathing tone, 
renouncing all government efforts to improve the economic situation.  Grafsky 
compares the promises of Gorbachev to the failed promises made by Josef 
Stalin, stating “in recent years ordinary Soviet citizens have been showered with 
promises of social boons.”301  He ties any increase in wages or pension amounts 
to the government’s willingness to print huge amounts of currency to satisfy 
promised increases, which are rendered moot by the inflation this behavior 
inevitably leads to.  He discusses with tangible levels of disgust the waffling of 
various government bodies as they struggle to come up with a working plan of 
any type to save the economy, revealing the contradictory nature of the poli-
cies adopted at that time.  He closes by saying, “The Soviet economy moves 
according to the principle, ‘One step forward, two steps back.’”302
 Clearly, the transformation is complete.  Socialist ideology is never even 
mentioned in this article.  No course is proposed, and there is little to no hope 
for the future of the economy, and almost no faith left in the government to 
solve the problems Grafsky argues it is only making worse with its own inepti-
tude and indecision.  There is no way this government-bashing rant, completely 
devoid of hope or any direction for the future, can be considered propaganda; 
at least not within the criteria established by Ellul.  This absence of propaganda 
indicates the absence of the state power Ellul held as necessary for propaganda 
to exist.  The Soviet Union was effectively done, officially ceasing to exist 10 
months following the publication of this article.
What happened?
How could reforms that started out so promising end in the dissolution of one 
of the world’s greatest superpowers?  At the beginning of the march towards 
greater openness and a more fair society, the Soviet Union represented a highly 
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centralized, bureaucratic, top-down oriented civilization.  In 6 short years, it 
would sign itself out of existence.  Surely, there must be a way to explain such 
a dramatic fall.
 We can arrive at one of many possible understandings by utilizing the 
theories of Jacques Ellul, as has been done throughout this study.  Ellul writes 
that propaganda must be rooted in action, and that a failure to take action is 
in itself counter-propaganda.303  The failure of the Soviet state to reach the 
goals it established for itself was its ultimate downfall.   The Communist Party 
promoted a new course of action, deeply rooted in Leninist theory and the idea 
that the Party is an effective representative of the people.  While democratiza-
tion was indeed achieved, the rest of the package was conspicuously absent. 
The economy was in a state of complete ruin, far from the promised consumer 
prosperity.  The legitimacy of the Party as a guiding force and the traditions 
it rested on were called into question and ultimately thrown out by voting 
citizens.  The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, its leaders and experts, 
and ideological foundations were rendered impotent and ineffectual in light 
of their public failings.  The social backbone that the propaganda and reforms 
were based on caved in.  Elections favored new political parties, and the Soviet 
Republics decided, one by one, to pursue their own separate courses of develop-
ment apart from the Soviet Union, consistent with the nationalist claims made 
by post-collapse historians.
 The close study of propaganda from this period demonstrates in stark terms 
the decline of Soviet state power.  From the initial speeches and statistics to 
mobilize the masses, to the open rejection of government policy, the collapse 
of the state is clear.  Ellul’s claim that propaganda represents a powerful state 
rings true in this case.  As Communist Party supremacy faded, the Soviet print 
media’s publications drifted farther and farther away from the characteristics 
of propaganda.  In a sense, this marks a sort of success the Communist Party 
and Gorbachev never intended for.  Perestroika and glasnost did indeed finally 
de-Stalinize the Soviet Union, but at the cost of the Union itself.  Soviet state 
power fell victim not only to the general failure of perestroika, but also to its 
limited successes.
303  Ellul, Propaganda, 21.
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